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ABSTRACT
In this study, we add to the literature by investigating the role of welfare states in intra-European 
migration decisions between 25 countries (2003-2008). Distinguishing between three welfare 
programmes (unemployment, family and old-age benefits) we tested whether social expenditure 
on each of these arrangements particularly influenced locational choices of individuals within 
the age groups covered by the respective welfare policy. Findings from a conditional logit model 
showed a positive impact of spending on family benefits on the locational choices of young adults 
moving together with children, and of spending on old-age benefits on the locational choices of 
individuals close to or above retirement age. In contrast, a negative impact of unemployment 
spending was found on locational choices in general, and those of working-age adults in particular. 
Our results highlight the importance of further disentangling the often-used general welfare 
spending measure when studying the link between welfare and migration.
Key words: welfare state; locational choices; intra-European; migration; life course; conditional 
logit model
INTRODUCTION
Although international migration is not a new 
phenomenon and has been taking place at 
different times and places all over the world 
(Battistella 2002), it is currently one of the 
key drivers of population change in Europe 
(Hierro et al. 2012). The heated debate sur-
rounding (economic) consequences of inter-
national migration, in a context of increasing 
globalisation, recent EU enlargements and di-
versity of EU member states’ regulations over 
immigration issues, has added interest to the 
subject (Kahanec & Zimmermann 2010). Even 
more so as the shifting nature of migration, 
which nowadays includes substantial numbers 
of intra-European movers and in which many 
countries are both origin and destination of 
migrants, is related to different drivers and con-
sequences of these moves (Ludwig & Johnson 
2017). The literature increasingly mentions 
the welfare state as a determinant of migrants’ 
locational choices (Ramos & Suriñach 2017). 
With the freedom of movement and related 
migrant’s rights currently figuring high on the 
political agenda throughout Europe, investi-
gating a potential link between migration and 
the welfare state seems highly relevant.
Central to the literature on the role of 
the welfare state in migration decisions is the 
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creat ive Commo ns Attri butio n-NonCo mmerc ial-NoDerivs License, which 
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‘welfare magnet hypothesis’: the expecta-
tion that migrants are attracted by generous 
welfare state arrangements (Borjas 1999). 
Geographical relocation would thus come with 
specific economic benefits for the individual. 
So far, the few studies that tested the welfare 
magnet hypothesis in Europe mainly looked 
at the correlation between the number of mi-
grants moving to a country and the amount of 
money spent on the welfare state by the gov-
ernment in that country. Results of these stud-
ies have been fairly mixed. Some researchers 
found a positive association between welfare 
spending and immigration rates, albeit the 
economic impact was often moderate (Warin 
& Svaton 2008; De Giorgi & Pellizzari 2009), 
whereas others found no evidence that coun-
tries with higher social expenditure attracted 
more migrants (Giulietti et al. 2013; Skupnik 
2014; Ponce 2018).
Inconsistent findings of previous studies 
may follow from two defining properties of 
the existing approach. First, most previous re-
search did not distinguish between migration 
towards Europe and mobility within Europe. 
This is problematic because different mi-
gration policies regulate these two forms of 
migration, and in turn shape migrants’ oppor-
tunities to access welfare state arrangements. 
In this study we therefore specifically study in-
tra-European migration. Within the European 
Union, mobility of EU citizens (as well as that of 
third country nationals who are long-term res-
idents) is facilitated (EMN 2004). Meanwhile, 
large differences can be observed between 
European countries in the total amount of 
money spent on welfare, as well as the welfare 
domains they prioritise. By focusing on the 
role of the welfare state in locational choices 
of intra-European migrants, we have a natural 
laboratory to disentangle the true effect of wel-
fare rather than capturing migration (entry) 
policies (Razin & Wahba 2011).
Second, the welfare magnet hypothesis 
originally not only addressed selection across 
alternative destinations, but also within immi-
gration flows (Skupnik 2014). It has been sug-
gested that destinations with more generous 
welfare states particularly attract migrants ben-
efiting from welfare state arrangements and 
discourage those who would be net contrib-
utors. Some scholars therefore reasoned that 
generous welfare states will particularly attract 
migrants with lower levels of education, as they 
would be most likely to benefit from a generous 
welfare state (e.g. Brücker et al. 2002). Despite 
this acknowledgment of individual differences 
in balancing the potential welfare benefit when 
migrating, so far, the role of the individual life 
stage has been largely overlooked. This is un-
fortunate, as the relationship between welfare 
and the individual changes over the life course. 
People are generally net receivers of welfare 
while they are in state-financed education, net 
contributors while they are working, and once 
again net receivers when they are retired or 
require expensive medical services (Legrain 
2008). Furthermore, in European welfare 
states, access to specific welfare state arrange-
ments is partly tied to life course characteris-
tics. We therefore contribute to the literature 
by investigating the role of welfare generosity 
in locational choices of migrants in different 
stages of their lives.
In this study, we reason that if generous 
welfare state arrangements especially attract 
migrants who are most likely to access them 
after arrival, the impact of government spend-
ing in different welfare domains should affect 
migration decisions differently across the life 
course. To test this hypothesis, we use bilat-
eral migration flow data from the Integrated 
Modelling of European Migration (IMEM) 
database, available for the years 2003–2008. 
We enriched the migration data with country 
level indicators retrieved from databases of 
the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Infor-
mations Internationales (CEPII), Migration 
Modelling for Statistical Analyses (MIMOSA), 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the World Bank. 
Locational choices of individuals who migrated 
between 25 selected European countries are 
modelled for the period 2003–2008 using a 
conditional logit model. Innovatively, we anal-
yse migrants in five age categories represent-
ing different life phases. By distinguishing 
between family, unemployment and old-age 
benefits, we test whether social expenditure on 
each of these welfare programmes influenced 
locational choices of intra-European migrants, 
and whether this influence is stronger for mi-
grants in the age groups eligible to receive 
them.
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THEORY
The welfare magnet hypothesis in the con-
text of Europe – In 1999, Borjas published his 
seminal study in which he hypothesised that 
immigrants to the United States would clus-
ter in those states where welfare benefits were 
the highest. His argument was that, since im-
migrants already accepted the costs of migra-
tion, it would cost them little extra to choose 
the ‘right’, namely, the most generous state. In 
his study, Borjas focused on a specific welfare 
programme: Aid for Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC). This way, his work contrib-
uted to a longer research tradition studying 
the impact of welfare benefits on interstate 
mobility in the US (McKinnish 2007). A popu-
lar approach in this literature has been to look 
at the migration behaviour of single mothers, 
and compare it to the migration behaviour of 
a group that is less likely to receive this type of 
welfare, such as married mothers, women with-
out children, or men. Borjas found that the 
demographic group most closely linked with 
the AFDC programme, namely female-headed 
households with children under 18  years of 
age, clustered in states with higher AFDC ben-
efits. As this clustering was more pronounced 
for recent immigrants, Borjas concluded that 
the theoretical framework was confirmed: im-
migrants who had just arrived in the US were 
more sensitive to interstate differences in wel-
fare benefits than natives. The expectation that 
welfare state arrangements might influence 
migration decisions became known in the liter-
ature as the ‘welfare magnet hypothesis’.
Interestingly, the welfare magnet hypoth-
esis has not been put to a test much outside 
the American context until quite recently. 
Pedersen and colleagues (2008) presented 
one of the first studies analysing international 
migration flows into a broader set of OECD 
countries. They found that welfare generosity 
– measured as social expenditure in percent-
age of GDP – did not exert a significant role 
in attracting migrants from 129 countries of 
origin between 1990 and 2000. The authors 
argued that this finding might be the result 
of restrictive migration policies that were in 
place in many OECD countries. Other scholars 
specifically looked at migration into the EU. 
De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) investigated 
immigration of individuals in the working ages 
from outside the EU into the EU 15 between 
1994 and 2001.1  Their analysis showed that 
the generosity of welfare did influence migra-
tion decisions, albeit the effect was very small. 
Warin and Svaton (2008) tested the effect of 
social expenditure on migration flows into the 
EU 15 over the period 1995–2004. The authors 
concluded that the labour market outlook in 
the host country was comparatively more im-
portant than welfare provisions. However, as 
long as its effect was not offset by a high un-
employment rate in the host country, the level 
of social expenditure was found to have a pos-
itive impact on migrants’ locational choices. 
Giulietti and colleagues (2013) in their analy-
ses distinguished between EU and non-EU mi-
grants. Their findings indicated that, between 
1993 and 2008, EU migrants did not react to 
the level of spending on unemployment ben-
efits in 19 European host countries. Skupnik 
(2014) looked at the determinants of changes 
in the stocks of EU migrants in the EU 15 over 
the years 2004–2011, and concluded that wel-
fare state variables did not affect migration 
flows when controlling for temporary political 
restrictions to the freedom of movement. Most 
recently, Ponce (2018) investigated the rela-
tion between total government spending and 
migration towards Nordic universalist welfare 
states over the years 1995–2010. His empiri-
cal findings showed a negative impact of total 
government spending on the size of migration 
flows, which turned positive after controlling 
for living costs in the destination country. The 
author concluded that instead of a magnet of 
generous welfare provisions, high costs of liv-
ing seemed to discourage migration towards 
these regions.
As this brief overview illustrates, studies on 
the relationship between the welfare state and 
migration for the European context are lim-
ited in number, and their empirical findings 
are mixed. However, because several studies 
did not distinguish between migration towards 
Europe and mobility within Europe, different 
migration policies regulating these two types 
of movement likely distort the results (Razin 
& Wahba 2011). Furthermore, these studies 
generally did not focus on the migration be-
haviour of a specific welfare-prone group, but 
rather compared the total number of migrants 
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moving to various destinations. In this study we 
address these gaps in the literature. First, we 
investigate bilateral migration flows between 
European countries, thus focusing exclusively 
on mobility within Europe. As part of the abol-
ishment of borders between European coun-
tries, EU citizens as well as non-EU citizens 
with a valid residence permit from one of the 
Schengen countries can move freely within the 
Schengen area (EPRS 2015). Our study con-
text in this way simulates full freedom of move-
ment and locational choices being not affected 
by migration restrictions set by law. Second, 
we test whether the influence of welfare pro-
grammes on locational choices is stronger 
for those migrants most likely to access them. 
Many European welfare state arrangements 
are targeted at individuals in specific phases of 
their lives (e.g. family allowances, unemploy-
ment benefits, pension systems). This may lead 
to differential effects of destination countries’ 
welfare generosity for migration decisions of 
people in different life stages. Yet whether this 
is indeed the case is so far unknown. Our con-
tribution to the literature is thus, that we in-
vestigate the role of welfare state arrangements 
in intra-European migration decisions by life 
stage.
Hypotheses – The welfare state literature 
posits that European countries have different 
spending priorities when it comes to welfare 
state arrangements across the life cycle (Kuitto 
2011). For example, a country could have a 
generous pension system, while at the same 
time providing little support in the case of 
unemployment. We therefore distinguish 
three welfare policy areas for which individuals 
become eligible at various stages of their lives: 
family benefits, unemployment benefits and 
old-age benefits (OECD 2016). Family benefits 
refer to financial support that is exclusively 
for families and children. This includes child-
related cash transfers such as child allowances, 
but also tax benefits and public spending on 
services for families with children like childcare 
and early education facilities. Unemployment 
benefits are defined as cash benefits for 
people to compensate for unemployment. 
Old-age benefits include old-age and survivors 
pensions, as well as services for the elderly such 
as day care and rehabilitation services, home-
help services and other benefits in kind. We 
expect social expenditure on each of these 
arrangements to have a positive influence on 
the locational choices of individuals within the 
age groups covered by the respective benefits:
H1a: Higher spending on family benefits has 
a positive impact on the locational choices of 
young adults moving together with children.
H1b: Higher spending on unemployment 
benefits has a positive impact on the locational 
choices of individuals in the working ages.
H1c: Higher spending on old-age benefits has 
a positive impact on the locational choices of 
individuals close to or above retirement age.
On the other hand, individuals who are not el-
igible to welfare in a certain domain have less 
to gain from higher social expenditure in that 
domain. For them, higher social expenditure 
may even be associated with higher taxes (Geis 
et al. 2013; Razin & Wahba 2015), or fewer re-
sources devoted to other welfare areas in the 
destination country (Kuitto 2011). Therefore, 
we expect no or even a negative effect of higher 
social expenditure for the age groups that can-
not enjoy the associated benefits:
H2: Higher spending on welfare state ar-
rangements that cannot be accessed by in-
dividuals, either due to their life stage or 
other eligibility criteria, has no or a negative 
impact on their locational choices.
In this sense, H1c may be somewhat ambiguous, 
as old-age benefits like pensions are typically built 
up over the individual’s working life. Individuals 
who migrate at older ages may therefore not be 
eligible for this type of benefit in the destination 
country, or at least partially receive their old-age 
benefits from the origin country. As such, the 
weakest effects are expected for this age group.
Other drivers of migration – Besides the 
welfare state, the extensive migration literature 
reports other economic, geographical, social/
historical and demographic factors that are 
important for migration decisions (Ramos 
& Suriñach 2017). Such drivers of migration 
are taken into account in our study. Income 
prospects are generally considered as a key 
driver of migration decisions (e.g. Kennan 
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& Walker 2011). Unemployment rates form 
another important economic factor, as 
the expected income after migration not 
only depends on the average wage in the 
destination country, but also on the likelihood 
of being employed (e.g. Docquier et al. 2014). 
Factors that lower the costs of migration, 
such as geographical and cultural closeness, 
are also expected to influence locational 
choices (e.g. Beine et al. 2011). In addition, 
the size of the general population in the 
destination country is sometimes considered, 
as a larger population may offer more 
connections, more opportunities, and more 
widely available information that may serve to 
reduce the migration costs (e.g. Davies et al. 
2001). Migration theories further recognise 
previous migration flows to the destination 
country as an important factor in migration 
decision-making. Already settled migrants 
may function as ‘bridgeheads’, reducing the 
risks and costs of subsequent migration and 
settlement by providing information and 
support (e.g. Massey 1998). Finally, migration 
policies likely affect the migration decision, as 
they can constrain people’s individual choices 
(e.g. Mayda 2010). As we focus on intra-
European migration, freedom of movement is 
ensured between the countries in our sample 
through regulations of the European Union 
or Schengen area. However, some countries 
in our sample only joined the EU in 2004, 
resulting in a changed policy context within 
the period under study. In addition, the 2003 
Accession Treaty allowed EU member states 
to restrict access to the labour market in the 
host country for migrants from eight of the 10 
countries that joined the EU in 2004 (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, referred to as 
the EU 8) during a seven-year transitional 
period (European Commission 2011).2  Due 
to these so-called ‘transitional arrangements’, 
these migrants initially needed a special work 
permit. Between 2004 and 2011, EU member 
states opened their labour markets to these 
workers at different stages. Such transitional 
restrictions may have directed migration 
flows towards the countries that immediately 
allowed free access to the labour market and 
are therefore included in our study.
DATA AND METHODS
Analytical approach – According to more eco-
nomic (rational choice) theories, migrants 
are expected to select the destination country 
with the highest returns after accounting for 
migration costs. As such, locational choices 
can be seen as the outcome of a comparison 
of a set of countries (i.e. the ‘choice set’) on 
a number of relevant attributes. Some attri-
butes will make an individual more likely to 
select a country as his or her destination, 
whereas the opposite may be the case for oth-
er attributes. Discrete choice analysis aims to 
estimate these impacts on the probability that 
an individual will select a particular location 
from the observed choices and characteristics 
of the countries in the choice set (Hoffman 
& Duncan 1988; McFadden 2002). This way, 
the focus of the approach differs from gravity 
models, which instead aim to explain the size 
of migration flows towards a destination (Anas 
1983; Mishra et al. 2013; Ramos & Suriñach 
2017; De Mello-Sampayo 2017). In this study 
we use a conditional logit model to investigate 
the impact of social expenditure on location-
al choices of intra-European migrants. Condi-
tional logit models have been used to analyse 
micro-level migration data (e.g. De Giorgi & 
Pellizzari 2009), yet can also be used for coun-
try-to-country migration flows (Davies et al. 
2001; Cushing & Poot 2004). Using this type 
of data, the size of the flows represents the 
number of individual moves. Characteristics 
of the countries in the choice set are subse-
quently used to explain the observed moves, 
whereby the estimated coefficients provide 
information about the relative value that in-
dividuals place on the various characteristics.
Identification strategy – In our statistical 
model, an individual originating from country 
i faces a choice among D alternative European 
destination countries. For the purpose of this 
study, we assume that the decision to migrate has 
already been taken, and the only choice to be 
made concerns the country of destination.3  The 
utility of choosing area d for this individual is:
(1)Uid =훽
�Xid +휀id ,
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where Xid is a vector of alternative-specific 
attributes that will affect individuals’ loca-
tion choices and εid is the error term. Each 
parameter in vector β corresponds to an al-
ternative-specific characteristic, for which the 
impact on location choices is held constant 
across alternatives. The individual migrant 
chooses destination d if the utility Uid is the 
highest among all D choices. The statistical 
model for the probability of moving from 
area i to area d can be represented as:
Assuming that the random utility compo-
nents are independent and identically dis-
tributed according to a Weibull distribution 
(McFadden 1973), the probability of an indi-
vidual migrant from country i choosing desti-
nation d can be rewritten as:
Note that our conditional logit model re-
quires estimation using N  ×  D observations, 
where N is the total number of individuals 
moving from all origins and D the number of 
alternatives. With 25 origin countries and 24 
potential destination choices (excluding the 
current country of residence), the log-likeli-
hood function is:
where Nij is the number of people moving from 
country i to country j and P(mij = 1) is given 
by (3).
The identification of a conditional logit 
model comes from comparing the same in-
dividual faced with different alternatives, in 
this case the countries in the choice set. This 
has two important implications. First, only in-
dependent variables describing the attributes 
of the destination countries (including those 
origin-destination specific) can directly enter 
the model.4  Characteristics of the origin 
country, year of migration, and individual 
characteristics (like age) on the other hand 
do not vary across alternatives, and therefore 
fall out of the probability function described 
in Equation (3). Second, a conditional logit 
model needs interaction terms to investigate 
whether the impact of some of the alterna-
tive-specific characteristics varies with indi-
vidual characteristics (Christiadi & Cushing 
2007). To test our hypotheses, we therefore 
estimate interaction effects between the 
dummy variables indicating the age group of 
individuals and the social expenditure mea-
sures. Comparing the estimated interaction 
coefficients allows us to see whether the ef-
fects of spending on particular welfare state 
arrangements on the locational choices of 
migrants differ between age groups.
Data – In our analyses, we use bilateral 
migration flow data from the Integrated 
Modelling of European Migration database 
(IMEM). This database contains the posterior 
distribution of the harmonised migration flows 
between 31 EU and European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) countries and the rest of 
the world (the latter discarded here) between 
2002 and 2008. The posterior distribution has 
been created by combining available data on 
migration, covariate information and expert 
knowledge within a statistical model.5  To 
our knowledge, IMEM is the only database 
providing complete information on bilateral 
migration flows covering all European 
countries together with information on the 
age of these migrants. The age composition 
is an important feature of the data, since we 
aim to investigate whether different effects 
can be observed for migrants in different age 
groups, representing different life stages. The 
IMEM data do not allow further disentangling 
individuals by nationality or country of birth, 
and thus cover intra-European moves of both 
European and non-European citizens. For 
intra-European mobility as studied here, non-
EU citizens with permanent residence enjoy 
similar rights as those with EU citizenship. 
However, it is possible that the impact of the 
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relocating within Europe differs between those 
with a European and non-European origin. 
Although we have no theoretical reasons to 
expect large differences, we cannot estimate 
them with the data but will reflect on this 
further in the discussion section.
In the analyses, 25 European countries are 
included: 22 of the 27 countries that were 
members of the European Union in 2008 
(Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom), and three non-EU countries 
within the Schengen area (Iceland, Norway 
and Switzerland). Bilateral migration flows 
between these 25 countries are analysed for 
all years between 2003 and 2008. For the 
purpose of this study we supplemented the 
migration data with country level indicators 
found to be relevant by previous migration re-
search, which were retrieved from databases 
of the CEPII, MIMOSA, OECD and the World 
Bank. All variables are time-varying and when 
indicated lagged by one year. As a result of 
missing data on at least one of the indicators, 
the following countries (although members 
of the European Union or Schengen area) 
could not be included in our final analyses: 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Malta and Romania. As migration flows 
from and towards Cyprus, Liechtenstein and 
Lithuania are comparatively very small, in-
cluding them  likely would not have affected 
our main results. Bulgaria and Romania on 
the other hand are characterised by consider-
able intra-European migration since their EU 
accession in 2007. The data we have at hand 
do not cover the period following this acces-
sion (but only up to 2008), so even if the data 
would be at hand, we could not have studied 
these countries properly. Having said that, it 
would have been interesting to study these 
countries. In the discussion section we reflect 
on the extent to which our data are generalis-
able to other periods and countries.
Variables – Within the IMEM migration data we 
distinguish between individuals moving in five 
age categories representing different stages of 
the life course: (i) children under 15  years of 
age, who likely migrated with their family; (ii) 
adolescents and young adults aged 15–25, who 
are either studying or early in their careers; (iii) 
migrants aged 25–40, who are the most likely to 
have or start a young family; (iv) migrants aged 
40–60, for whom work and family life have likely 
stabilised; and (v) migrants above 60 years of age, 
who are close to or above the legal retirement 
age. Although migrants in the first age category 
are too young to make their own locational 
choices, we include them in the analyses as a 
separate category to observe the choices of their 
caretakers. Although we recognise that this in 
a way results in a double representation of the 
choices of caretakers in the model, we deem 
this is the most accurate way to grasp the impact 
of moving together with children on locational 
choices in this type of macro-level data.
Like most scholars investigating the relation 
between the welfare state and migration across 
Europe, we rely on government spending on 
social provisions to measure welfare state gen-
erosity, due to the availability, (relative) com-
parability and variation of these data across 
countries and time. However, we supplement 
the aggregated measure of social expenditure 
with measures of expenditure in three policy 
areas: family, unemployment and old age. Data 
on social expenditure for each of the years 
under study are obtained from the OECD da-
tabase (2016) and expressed as a percentage of 
the gross domestic product (GDP). Although 
the OECD database also includes information 
on expenditure in additional areas (e.g. ‘inca-
pacity related’ and ‘housing’), we choose these 
three domains because of their clear link to 
specific phases of the life course. To account 
for issues of reverse causality we use lagged 
terms, capturing social expenditure one year 
before migration.
In the literature, GDP per capita in each 
destination is usually treated as an adequate 
measure of income prospects of potential mi-
grants (e.g. Beine et al. 2016). In our study, 
annual information on GDP per capita (in 
thousands of US dollars) from the World 
Bank (2017) is included. The unemployment 
rate in our study captures the percentage of 
the total labour force in the country of desti-
nation that was unemployed in the year prior 
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to migration according to figures of the World 
Bank (2017). The distance indicator reflects 
the absolute distance between the capital cit-
ies of two countries in hundreds of kilome-
tres. The common border variable  indicates 
whether two countries had shared borders 
(1) or not (0). Both variables are retrieved 
from the GeoDist database of CEPII (Mayer 
& Zignago 2011). The language variable in-
dicates the closeness of two different native 
languages along a continuous index ranging 
from 0 to 1, where higher values represented 
greater closeness. The variable is obtained 
from the Language database of CEPII, and 
considers whether countries share a common 
official language, a common native language 
and the linguistic proximity of two languages 
(Melitz & Toubal 2014). Population size in 
millions is included as a proxy for the num-
ber of locations and for network and creative 
opportunities available at the destination 
country (World Bank 2017). Due to missing 
values for several origin–destination coun-
try pairs we could not include information 
on the size of the specific migrant groups in 
each of the destination countries. Instead, 
we use the percentage of EU born migrants 
within the population of the destination 
country lagged one year as a proxy of the mi-
grant network, retrieved from the MIMOSA 
database (MIMOSA 2008). We further in-
clude the lagged percentage of all migrants 
in the total population living in the destina-
tion country. The dummy variable on restric-
tions indicates for each year between 2003 
and 2008 separately whether migrants from 
a specific origin country had legal access to 
the labour market of a destination country 
(0), or that restrictions applied to these mi-
grants over that whole year (1). Such restric-
tions followed from either the origin or the 
destination country not being a member of 
the EU yet, or from the transitional arrange-
ments introduced in some EU member states 
to temporarily protect their labour markets 
against large influxes of migrants shortly 
after the EU enlargement.6  Finally, in order 
to study any other unobserved characteristics 
of the destination country, destination coun-
try fixed effects (FE) are included in some of 
our models.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics – Figure 1 describes for 
each of the 25 countries in the sample the 
total number of immigrants coming from 
the remaining 24 countries by year. Between 
2003 and 2008, the number of immigrants was 
highest for the UK, Germany and France. Al-
though the numbers clearly differed between 
the countries in our sample, bilateral flows 
always exceeded zero with one exception: the 
bilateral migration flows between Slovenia and 
Estonia in 2003.
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of 
the country level variables for the years be-
tween 2003 and 2008 grouped together. As 
becomes clear from these figures, old-age ben-
efits made up the largest share within all social 
expenditure, whereas social expenditure on 
family or unemployment benefits represented 
much smaller shares of the GDP. Figure 2 por-
trays the distribution of the levels of social 
expenditure by country and year. Over the pe-
riod under study, variation occurred between 
countries in both the total level of government 
spending on welfare as a share of the GDP, and 
spending on the different welfare domains. 
Of the three welfare domains, differences be-
tween European countries were the largest for 
old-age programmes.
Conditional logit models – Migration 
researchers often have little information 
about the representativeness of their 
parameter estimates over time (Davies et 
al. 2001). To investigate the stability of 
our parameter estimates, we started by 
estimating the model for the six consecutive 
years (2003–2008) separately. This way, all 
parameters were free to vary across time. 
Results appeared relatively stable over time 
and no substantive differences were observed 
in the effects of our main variables of interest. 
Therefore, we present results of a pooled 
model that covers all years under study (full 
details of all models available upon request 
from the first author).
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates 
of the first six conditional logit models. In the 
first model (column (1)) we included eco-
nomic, geographical, social/historical and 
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demographic drivers of migration. In line 
with what we expected, GDP per capita in the 
destination country had a positive and signifi-
cant effect, indicating it acted as a pull factor. 
Furthermore, the effect of the unemployment 
rate in the destination country one year before 
migration was negative and significant, indi-
cating a preference of migrants for countries 
where the unemployment rate was lower. The 
results show that intra-European migrants were 
less likely to choose countries with a larger share 
of migrants in the population, yet controlling 
Figure 1. Immigration from the 25 countries in the study by country of destination and year (absolute numbers).
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for migrant stock they were more likely to 
choose countries with larger shares of EU mi-
grants. This is possibly the result of a migrant 
network effect via which origin and destination 
are connected. As expected, the probability of 
choosing a certain destination increased when 
the country was closer to the origin country, 
when it concerned a neighbouring country 
and when its language was more similar to that 
of the origin country. Furthermore, migrants 
were more likely to select a destination country 
with a larger (total) population.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics country-level variables 2003-2008.
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP per capita (t-1)a 32.21 19.24 4.03 102.52
Unemployment Rate (t-1) 7.36 3.67 2.25 19.90
Population Sizeb 18.86 23.33 0.29 82.53
Distancec 1.06 0.64 0.06 2.89
Common Border 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Language Similarity 0.32 0.21 0.09 0.88
Migrant Population (t-1)d 10.51 6.71 1.75 34.27
EU Migrant Population (t-1)d 4.37 5.38 0.61 27.84
Spending Total (t-1)e 20.84 4.25 11.05 28.69
Spending Family (t-1)e 2.21 0.82 0.91 3.79
Spending Unemployment (t-1)e 0.89 0.70 0.00 3.23
Spending Old-Age (t-1)e 7.23 2.23 2.21 11.51
Notes: aIn thousands of US dollars.
bIn millions.
cIn thousands of kilometers.
dAs a percentage of the destination country’s population.
eAs a percentage of GDP.
Figure 2. Variance in total social expenditure and social expenditure on unemployment, family and old-age benefits: 
distribution by country and year.
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Over the years under study, the variable 
capturing labour market restrictions yielded a 
positive effect, indicating that migrants more 
often chose a country where they needed a 
special work permit to enter the labour mar-
ket. To explain this rather unexpected and 
counterintuitive result, we looked back at the 
year-specific analyses. These findings show 
that prior to 2006 migrants were less likely 
to move to countries where they had lim-
ited access to the labour market. During this 
phase, only three member states (Ireland, UK 
and Sweden) opened their labour markets 
for EU 8 workers. From 2006 onwards, EU 8 
migrants gradually gained free access to the 
labour markets in eight more member states 
(Greece, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Luxembourg and France). With 
the restrictions being abolished in most coun-
tries during this latter phase of our observation 
period (2006–2008) our variable seems to cap-
ture increased migration flows from the new 
member states into the EU 15 in anticipation 
of unrestricted labour market access over the 
following years.
We subsequently included the variable cap-
turing total social expenditure in the destina-
tion country a year before migration (column 
Table 2. Conditional logit models (2003–2008): estimated coefficients.
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP p.c. (t-1) 0.00337*** 0.00837*** 0.000980*** 0.00143*** −0.000305 0.000366*
  (0.0000406) (0.0000419) (−0.00018) (0.000178) (0.000180) (0.000182)
Unemp. (t-1) −0.0173*** −0.00838*** −0.0354*** −0.0344*** −0.0309*** −0.0332***
  (0.000151) (0.000149) (−0.00034) (0.000310) (0.000329) (0.000356)
Pop. Size 0.0304*** 0.0330*** 0.0152*** −0.0176*** 0.0155*** 0.0222***
  (0.0000140) (0.0000151) (−0.00132) (0.00133) (0.00126) (0.00134)
Distance −0.776*** −0.796*** −0.795*** −0.794*** −0.795*** −0.795***
  (0.000901) (0.000893) (−0.00098) (0.000975) (0.000975) (0.000975)
Com. Border 0.458*** 0.535*** 0.698*** 0.698*** 0.698*** 0.698***
  (0.000979) (0.000996) (−0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00113)
Lang. Sim. 0.574*** 0.411*** 0.372*** 0.376*** 0.372*** 0.372***
  (0.00231) (0.00238) (−0.00262) (0.00262) (0.00262) (0.00262)
% Mig. (t-1) −0.0477*** −0.0440*** −0.0250*** −0.0237*** −0.0132*** −0.0238***
  (0.000137) (0.000129) (−0.00196) (0.00195) (0.00199) (0.00196)
% EU Mig. 
(t-1)
0.0283*** 0.0170*** 0.0378*** 0.0304*** 0.0318*** 0.0391***
  (0.000187) (0.000184) (−0.00312) (0.00312) (0.00313) (0.00313)
Restrictions 0.126*** 0.142*** 0.313*** 0.323*** 0.313*** 0.313***
  (0.00118) (0.00118) (−0.00136) (0.00137) (0.00136) (0.00136)
Soc. Exp. Total 
(t-1)
  −0.0488*** 0.00898***      
    (0.000113) (0.00083)      
Soc. Exp. 
Family (t-1)
      0.307***    
        (0.00380)    
Soc. Exp. 
Unemp. (t-1)
        −0.0840***  
          (0.00313)  
Soc. Exp. Old 
Age (t-1)
          −0.00874***
            (0.00208)
Destination FE NO NO YES YES YES YES
pseudo R2 0.1827 0.1861 0.2201 0.2202 0.2201 0.2201
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Each column is a separate model 
with interactions of specific spending measures and age groups. All controls in Table 2 included. The total 
migration flow size is 211,168,704.
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(2), Table 2). The coefficient was significant 
and negative, indicating that migrants were 
less likely to move to countries that spent a 
larger share within the GDP on the welfare 
state. The negative impact of total government 
spending on locational choices is in contrast 
with the welfare magnet hypothesis. As the 
pull effect of GDP per capita on locational 
choices increased when taking social expen-
diture into account, higher tax rates (Ruyssen 
et al. 2014) or costs of living (Ponce 2018) in 
(rich) countries with generous welfare systems 
may explain this finding. Alternately, our find-
ings could be explained from countries with a 
more generous welfare state – for example the 
Scandinavian countries – often having a more 
regulated labour market, which makes it more 
difficult for migrants to enter. To capture these 
potential institutional differences and any 
other unobserved characteristics at the coun-
try level, destination country fixed effects (FE) 
were included in the model (column (3)). 
Social expenditure in this model was positively 
associated with locational choices. The nega-
tive coefficient of social expenditure (column 
(2)) thus appears to be due to omitted coun-
try-level characteristics that affected the level 
of expenditure.
In the next three models (Table 2, columns 
(4)–(6)) we included more specific measures 
of social expenditure devoted to family, unem-
ployment and old-age programmes. Spending 
on family programmes was positively associ-
ated with locational choices of intra-European 
migrants, whereas smaller and negative impacts 
were found for spending on unemployment 
benefits and old-age. When including social 
expenditure on family benefits, the positive 
impact of population size on locational choices 
turned negative (column (4)). Furthermore, 
when including social expenditure on unem-
ployment benefits in the model, the positive 
impact of GDP per capita on locational choices 
became negative (column (5)). These changes 
indicate that social expenditure data are asso-
ciated with other characteristics of the country, 
such as the demographic composition of the 
population and its economic situation. In the 
discussion section we further elaborate on the 
implications of this for our findings.
To test whether the effect of welfare dif-
fered across life stages, in a next step (Table 3) 
we included interaction terms for each of the 
welfare generosity measures with the five age 
categories. Table 3 only presents the estimated 
coefficients of the social expenditure measures 
for the different age groups, which are our key 
variables of interest. Other effects were similar 
to the ones reported in Table 2 (with the des-
tination country FE). Chi-square tests showed 
that the coefficients of the interaction terms 
differ significantly between age groups for 
each type of welfare spending.
We expected higher social expenditure on 
welfare state arrangements to have a positive 
impact on locational choices for individuals 
within the age groups covered by the respec-
tive programmes. In Table 3 (column (1)) we 
Table 3. Conditional logit models (2003–2008): estimated coefficients of social expenditure variables by age group.
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Soc.Exp. Total (t-1) Soc.Exp. Fam (t-1) Soc.Exp. Unemp (t-1) Soc.Exp. Old (t-1)
Under 15 0.0199*** 0.421*** –0.0444*** –0.00562**
  (0.00086) (0.00398) (0.00335) (0.00212)
Age 16–25 0.0172*** 0.387*** –0.114*** –0.0158***
  (0.00085) (0.00391) (0.00328) (0.00211)
Age 26–40 –0.00358*** 0.361*** –0.139*** –0.0370***
  (0.00083) (0.00384) (0.00317) (0.00209)
Age 41–60 0.0135*** 0.106*** –0.0190*** 0.0282***
  (0.00085) (0.00391) (0.00326) (0.0021)
Over 60 0.0406*** –0.0188*** 0.124*** 0.0939***
  (0.00091) (0.00425) (0.00364) (0.00219)
Destination FE YES YES YES YES
pseudo R2 0.2204 0.2218 0.2209 0.2209
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see a positive impact of total welfare expen-
diture on locational choices for all but one 
age group: adults early in their working lives, 
who are likely the main net contributors to 
sustain the welfare state. We subsequently es-
timated age-specific effects for the different 
welfare domains (Table 3, columns (2)–(4)). 
Migrants in the younger age categories more 
often selected destination countries that 
spent more on social services for families. 
This is consistent with H1a, as those migrants 
are the ones most likely to benefit from this 
type of welfare policy. We also found a posi-
tive impact of social expenditure on old-age 
benefits on locational choices of migrants in 
the oldest two age categories, which confirms 
H1c. However, in contrast with H1b, estimates 
of the second model indicated that individ-
uals in the early working ages were the least 
likely to move to countries with higher spend-
ing on unemployment benefits. This finding 
is net of differences in unemployment levels 
at destination countries, which should auto-
matically inflate the share of that type of ex-
penditure over GDP.
We further expected a non-significant or 
negative impact of higher social expenditure 
for individuals who are less likely to access 
these welfare state arrangements (H2). In 
line with this hypothesis, social expenditure 
on old-age benefits had a negative impact on 
locational choices of migrants in the younger 
age categories. Also confirming H2, migrants 
above 60 years of age were the least likely to 
move to countries that spent more on fam-
ily benefits. This could indicate that higher 
expenditure on family benefits is associated 
with a higher tax burden for this age group, 
or less resources devoted to old-age benefits. 
However, in contrast to H2, spending on un-
employment benefits had a positive impact on 
migration behaviour of the oldest migrants.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
A conditional logit model assumes indepen-
dence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA), 
which implies that the probability ratio of 
individuals choosing between two alternatives 
should not depend on the availability or attri-
butes of the other alternatives. Earlier studies 
reported that findings from conditional logit 
models are qualitatively very similar to mod-
els that relax the IIA assumption (Dahlberg & 
Eklöf 2003; Train 2003; Christiadi & Cushing 
2007), and that the preferred modelling tech-
nique thus depends on the research question 
(see e.g. Train 2003). In our study we aimed to 
understand individuals’ average preferences 
rather than predicting how the preference 
for a destination may change depending on 
the characteristics of other available destina-
tion countries. For this purpose, violating the 
IIA assumption is less of an issue (Train 2003) 
and a conditional logit model is a useful an-
alytical strategy. Nevertheless, to validate our 
findings we follow Hausman and McFadden 
(1984), who note that if IIA is satisfied, the 
estimated coefficients should be stable across 
choice sets. To check for potential violations 
of IIA, we therefore re-estimated our mod-
els 25 times, each time dropping one of the 
destinations. Overall, the coefficients were 
comparable across these samples, suggesting 
that the IIA property was not seriously vio-
lated in our data. However, when Germany 
and the UK were dropped, the effect of total 
spending went in the opposite direction than 
reported before. On the one hand, this may 
indicate that the positive impact of total so-
cial expenditure on locational choices of 
intra-European migrants is driven by the 
largest migration flows in our dataset. At the 
same time, it seems likely that this simply 
points to the fact that the expenditure mea-
sure captures different domains of spending 
and other unobserved characteristics, as in-
dicated in our analyses. This could also ex-
plain why previous studies using the generic 
total spending measure reported such mixed 
results. Applying the same procedure to the 
models including social expenditure in the 
distinct welfare domains, the coefficients 
were robust for family and unemployment 
benefits. The much weaker effect we found 
in our main analyses for old-age benefits in 
six cases turned non-significant or yielded a 
negative effect for the oldest age group when 
a country was removed from the sample.
A conditional logit model aims to explain 
choice behaviour from the characteristics of 
both the accepted and rejected alternatives 
in a person’s choice set. Yet whether a person 
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chooses to move to let’s say France or Spain, 
his/her age, year of migration and origin 
country remain the same. Because of this, 
these variables cannot enter the conditional 
logit model directly. To explore the influence 
of these additional factors on our results, we 
estimated logistic regressions which simulated 
the conditional logit models by including each 
individual 24 times: once for the destination 
that was actually selected, and 23 times for the 
remaining alternatives in the choice set. This 
way, fixed effects of destination, origin, year 
and age could be estimated as a robustness 
check. Findings of these logit models were all 
consistent with those of the conditional logit 
models presented in the results section before.
A final robustness check was done to see 
whether our findings would change when all 
variables in our models were allowed to vary 
with age. For this we estimated distinct mod-
els for each of the five age categories. Age 
group-specific effects of total social expendi-
ture, as well as those of social expenditure on 
family, unemployment and old-age in these 
models without destination country FE were 
all comparable to those presented in Table 3.
DISCUSSION
With this study we aimed to investigate the role 
of welfare generosity in locational choices of 
migrants moving between European countries 
in different life stages. We expected higher so-
cial expenditure on welfare state arrangements 
to have a positive impact on locational choices 
for individuals within the age groups covered 
by the respective programmes. On the other 
hand, we expected a non-significant or neg-
ative impact of higher social expenditure for 
individuals who are less likely to access these 
welfare state arrangements. When we con-
trolled for unobserved variation by means of 
destination country fixed effects, our empiri-
cal analyses showed a positive impact of total 
social expenditure on locational choices for all 
age groups except adults early in their work-
ing lives. This finding is consistent with our 
theoretical reasoning, as these individuals are 
most likely to be net contributors to the sys-
tem. We further estimated the effects of gov-
ernment spending on family, unemployment 
and old-age benefits separately for migrants 
in different age groups. Our findings showed 
that the impact of social spending in specific 
welfare domains on locational choices varied 
across age groups, and were partly in line with 
our hypotheses.
Consistent with our first hypothesis, 
young adults moving together with children 
moved more often towards countries where 
the government spent more on family bene-
fits. Furthermore, migrants in the oldest age 
groups more often selected countries with 
higher social expenditure on old-age benefits. 
In contrast, younger migrants were less likely 
than migrants above 60 to move towards coun-
tries that spent more on welfare support for 
the elderly, whereas migrants in the older age 
groups were less likely to move towards coun-
tries that spent more on family benefits. These 
findings are in line with our second hypothe-
sis, and may indicate that when a person is not 
eligible to welfare in a certain domain, higher 
social expenditure in that domain is associ-
ated with higher costs (Geis et al. 2013; Razin 
& Wahba 2015) or fewer resources devoted to 
other welfare areas in the destination country 
(Kuitto 2011). Contrary to our expectations, 
spending on unemployment benefits had a 
negative effect on locational choices of mi-
grants in the working ages, whereas the effect 
was positive for migrants outside the working 
ages. On the one hand, this finding might fol-
low from young adults being less likely to be en-
titled to generous unemployment benefits due 
to limited experience on the labour market. 
Alternatively, although we controlled for un-
employment rates in the destination country, 
higher spending on unemployment benefits 
might indicate less stability on the labour mar-
ket – a factor particularly crucial for migrants 
at the beginning of their work career. Thus, so-
cial expenditure in this domain may reflect the 
economic situation in the destination country 
rather than the generosity of unemployment 
benefits. This also possibly explains why GDP 
per capita no longer had a positive impact on 
locational choices after social expenditure on 
unemployment benefits entered the model. 
Future studies could take this further and look 
more into the signalling effect that spending 
on unemployment may have for locational 
choices of these younger migrants in particular.
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Following the existing European literature 
on the welfare magnet hypothesis, in this study 
we used measures of social expenditure as in-
dicators of welfare generosity. However, as the 
findings on unemployment benefits indicate, 
social expenditure not necessarily reflects the 
generosity of welfare state arrangements, but 
rather reveals the level of government interfer-
ence in specific societal domains. Our results 
may indicate that such government inter-
ference is evaluated positively by migrants in 
the working ages when it comes to the family 
domain, whereas it is evaluated negatively in 
the domain of unemployment and old-age. 
Alternatively, rather than an indicator of gen-
erous welfare programmes, higher govern-
ment spending might be a reaction to certain 
societal developments, such as an insecure 
labour market or an aging population. After 
all, expenditure on social benefits is highly 
dependent on the size of the population in 
need (Caminada et al. 2010). Higher social 
expenditure on old-age benefits for instance 
may indicate a relatively old age structure of 
the destination country. This could be per-
ceived negatively by migrants in the different 
age groups, yet in particular by migrants in the 
working ages. The locational choices of mi-
grants subsequently may be explained by these 
societal developments rather than by welfare 
spending as such. Our study clearly shows that 
using social expenditure measures, as is com-
monly done in this field of research, it is not 
possible to fully disentangle these effects. By es-
timating age-specific relations we revealed the 
importance of testing the relation between mi-
gration and the welfare state in a more targeted 
way and paying attention to varying needs and 
interests of individuals over the life course. 
Future research should address this issue fur-
ther using more precise indicators of welfare 
generosity, such as social rights (Scruggs 2007) 
rather than generic spending measures.
In our study we did not include the option 
of staying in the country rather than migrat-
ing for a range of theoretical and pragmatic 
reasons. First, we follow the theoretical rea-
soning of Borjas (1999), who claims that 
welfare would attract migrants because the 
costs of choosing the ‘right’ country are low 
once the decision to migrate is made. This 
reasoning assumes that a person first decides 
whether to move, and subsequently decides 
where to move. Second, due to data availabil-
ity, in our study we were unable to include 
all possible destination countries available to 
individuals. This means that individuals who 
did not move to one of the other countries 
in our sample did not necessarily stay in the 
origin country, but could have moved to an-
other region of the world. Because of this, it 
is unclear how the sample of non-migrants 
should be defined. Finally, Rivero-Fuentes 
(2005) compared three types of conditional 
choice models using the same data on inter-
nal migration in Mexico. In her study, mod-
els treating the probability of out-migration 
and the choice of destination as two different 
processes yielded more reliable results than a 
model assuming that the decision to migrate 
and the choice of destination are made simul-
taneously. For these reasons, we restricted our 
sample to individuals who migrated between 
the 25 selected European countries. However, 
one could also argue that the decision re-
garding whether to move should not be sep-
arated from the decision regarding where to 
move (Davies et al. 2001). Future studies could 
therefore expand on our work and consider 
also stayers in the analyses. This could answer 
complementary research questions but would 
also call for a different design, data require-
ments and analytical approach.
Third, in this study we distinguished mi-
grants in different age groups as an indicator 
of their opportunities to access family, unem-
ployment and old-age benefits. However, life 
stage is a necessary, yet not always sufficient 
condition for welfare access (Clasen & Clegg 
2006). Family allowances often are a univer-
sal benefit available to all families with un-
der-aged children, whereas unemployment 
benefits largely depend on paid contribu-
tions. Some old-age benefits, like pensions, 
further are typically built up in the country 
of residence over time. In addition, the legal 
retirement age varies across Europe: for in-
stance, in 2003, the legal retirement age was 
60 in Belgium versus 67 in Norway (Scruggs et 
al. 2018). In sum, migrants who move in the 
life stages addressed by these different wel-
fare state arrangements are not necessarily 
able to access them in the destination coun-
try directly upon arrival. Nevertheless, these 
PETRA W. DE JONG ET AL.178
© 2019 The Authors. Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal 
Dutch Geographical Society / Koninklijk Nederlands Aardrijkskundig
migrants are still most likely to benefit from 
generous arrangements compared to those 
who do not meet this first categorical require-
ment. Related to this issue, although health-
care is yet another interesting welfare domain 
which can be linked to the life cycle, we did 
not include social expenditure on health, on 
the one hand  because health care needs of 
individuals may vary substantially, and on the 
other hand because large differences exist 
in the way healthcare is organised across 
Europe (Wendt et al. 2009). In some coun-
tries healthcare is mainly financed through 
(private) social insurance, whereas costs of 
healthcare in other countries are covered 
by taxes. Mapping these differences in insti-
tutional and organisational features for the 
countries in our study is beyond the scope of 
our work, yet investigating the impact of such 
differences on locational choices would be an 
interesting direction for future research.
Finally, in our study we covered all those who 
are mobile within Europe without making an 
explicit distinction by whether the person has 
an EU or non-EU origin. Data limitations pre-
vented us from making this further subdivision 
which could be interesting for future studies 
once data may come available to do so. The 
same holds for the fact that we could not yet in-
clude recent developments in migration flows 
such as those related to Romania and Bulgaria. 
Future work may be able to cover these different 
dimensions further, therewith also testing the 
extent to which our findings are stable or sub-
ject to change over time or for specific groups.
Findings of previous studies on the link be-
tween welfare spending and migration have 
been rather mixed: some studies found no 
support for an attracting impact of higher 
social expenditure (Giulietti et al. 2013; 
Skupnik 2014) whereas others revealed a 
(small) positive effect (De Giorgi & Pellizzari 
2009). In addition, several scholars found the 
impact to vary with other variables such as 
unemployment rate (Warin & Svaton 2008), 
costs of living (Ponce 2018) or migration 
policies (Razin & Wahba 2011) in the desti-
nation country. With this study we add to this 
literature by focusing on migration within 
the open mobility regime of the EU. In ad-
dition, we distinguished between three differ-
ent social domains and estimated effects for 
individuals in five age categories separately. 
As we showed that the effects of government 
spending on welfare state arrangements vary 
for migrants across the life course, our study 
helps explaining the inconsistent findings 
of previous studies which mainly focused on 
the size of migration flows rather than their 
composition. Furthermore, our findings 
indicate that a generic measure as welfare 
spending is rather uninformative, not only 
because it captures many different aspects 
of welfare but also because it is associated to 
other country characteristics. Only when dis-
entangling this measure in its different parts 
we are able to understand the true processes 
behind them. Finally, we can conclude that 
the impact of welfare state arrangements on 
locational choices depends on how migrants 
are affected by them after settlement. Future 
studies should elaborate on this insight and 
investigate which aspects of the welfare state 
are most relevant to migrants in different 
phases of life.
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Notes
 1. EU 15 refers to the 15 member states of the EU 
prior to EU enlargements since 2004: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK.
 2. No such restrictions were in place for two of the 
new member states, Cyprus and Malta.
 3. Arguments for this assumption are discussed in 
the discussion section.
 4. As the option of staying in the origin country is 
not included in the choice set, all alternatives 
are automatically compared to the individual’s 
origin country. A model including the variables 
as difference scores between origin and destina-
tion would therefore yield identical results.
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 5. For the methodology of producing the harmon-
ised flow tables, see Raymer et al. (2013).
 6. Detailed information on the timing of these transi-
tional arrangements is included in the Appendix.
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APPENDIX 
Transitional arrangements regarding the 2004 EU 
enlargement
• 2004: only Ireland, the UK and Sweden 
opened their labour markets to workers from 
the EU 8. Hungary, Poland and Slovenia 
used reciprocal measures and restricted ac-
cess to their labour markets for nationals 
from those member states that restricted la-
bour market access for their nationals;
• 2006: Greece, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Italy 
and Iceland opened their labour markets to 
workers from the EU 8;
• 2007: The Netherlands and Luxembourg 
opened their labour markets to workers 
from the EU 8;
• 2008: France opened its labour market and 
the reciprocal measures were dropped by 
Slovenia and Poland;
• Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland and Norway maintained their 
restrictions to workers from the EU 8 over 
the full period under study. Hungary main-
tained its reciprocal measures.
Source: European Commission (2011).
